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I.   INTRODUCTION
Sales are beginning to take place over the Internet and on-line in
significant numbers.1 As commerce moves from the real world to the
virtual world, states will lose needed revenue if sales over the Inter-
net and on-line are nontaxable by states.2 This Article examines the
possibility of imposing sales and use tax collection obligations on
sellers of tangible goods on-line or over the Internet.3 Part II dis-
                                                                                                                 
* Associate, Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, New York, N.Y. B.S., New York
University, 1990; J.D., Hofstra University, 1993. The author thanks Lori Hoberman and
Bill Burke for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. See JILL H. ELLSWORTH & MATTHEW V. ELLSWORTH, MARKETING ON THE IN-
TERNET: MULTIMEDIA STRATEGIES FOR THE WORLDWIDE WEB 4 (1995).
2. See Ilana DeBare, Cyber-Shopping Costly for Counties, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 17,
1995, at F1.
3. Note that this Article does not discuss the taxation of Internet service providers
(ISPs). Several states have proposed, or have already begun, the taxing of ISPs. A discus-
sion of the taxation of ISPs on their gross receipts is beyond the scope of this Article.
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cusses the recent growth of commerce on-line and over the Internet,
the resulting problem faced by states of lost revenue in the form of
sales tax, and the confusion faced by parties conducting sales over
the Internet as to their tax collection obligations. Part III describes
the constitutional barriers to the taxation of out-of-state sellers. Part
IV analyzes several suggested proposals for the constitutional taxa-
tion of out-of-state sellers. Finally, Part V concludes that unless
there is a federal legislative solution in the area, states may not im-
pose tax collection obligations on out-of-state sellers that sell over
the Internet or on-line without any other presence in-state. Thus,
companies and individual vendors are free to engage in tax-free
sales on-line or over the Internet.
II.   LOSS OF SALES TAX REVENUE ON VIRTUAL SALES
A.   Virtual Sales
1.   Storefronts on the Internet
The Internet is a large, interconnected network of over 60,000
computer networks,4 linking over 55 million people all over the
world via phone lines, satellites, and other telecommunications sys-
tems.5 “Information divided into small ‘packets’ of data flows
through this Weblike structure, hopping from one computer to the
next on its way to far-off destinations.”6 The manipulation of the
data is left to the computers on each end.7
Information on the Internet is organized into several parts and
tools,8 the most exciting of which is the World Wide Web (Web). The
Web gathers information from all over the Internet.9 Instead of see-
ing information as a line of text, a graphical interface provides users
with icons, illustrations, photographs, and sound.10
A seller with a site on the Web may use it as a virtual store-
front.11 By setting up a Web site, the seller can publish information
about itself and its products or services by using text and eye-
                                                                                                                 
4. See Robin Gareiss, The Online Corporation: Choosing the Right Internet Service
Provider, DATA COMMUNICATIONS, Nov. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, Cmpcom Library,
Data File.
5. See World Wide Web User Statistics (visited Feb. 7, 1997) <http://www.why-
not.com/company/stats.htm>; Rosalind Resnick, A Network to End All Networks, PC
NOVICE GUIDE TO GOING ONLINE, Dec. 1995, at 114, 114.
6. Alan Phelps, How the Internet Works, PC NOVICE GUIDE TO THE INTERNET, June
1996, at 12, 12.
7. See Faces of the Net, PC NOVICE GUIDE TO THE INTERNET, June 1996, at 10, 10.
8. See Rosalind Resnick, Tooling Through the Internet, PC NOVICE GUIDE TO GOING
ONLINE, Dec. 1995, at 116, 116.
9. See id. at 121.
10. See id.
11. See, e.g., Pete Loshin, Internet Commerce: The Gold Rush of the New Millennium,
PC NOVICE GUIDE TO THE INTERNET, June 1996, at 86.
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catching graphics, as well as sound and video clips.12 Potential cus-
tomers can point and click their way through the electronic equiva-
lent of four-color magazine ads and thousands of on-line shopping
malls.13 Consumers can use the Web to compare prices and specifi-
cations of products, view multimedia clips of products, and place or-
ders.14
Consider the example of a woman who wants to buy a new laser
printer for a computer she uses in her business. Instead of going to
several different computer and electronics stores, she can simply log
on to her computer, connect to the Internet, and access the Web
pages of several electronics equipment merchants. The Web sites
can display the different printers available, describe their features,
list their prices, and even show samples of the printers’ output. The
Web site also can provide answers to frequently asked questions
about the products, or provide for a mechanism by which the Web
site accepts questions and furnishes answers about the product. Af-
ter comparing product features and prices, the woman can simply
choose the right printer for her and place an order via the Web site
itself, saving a great amount of time and energy.
2.   Storefronts On-line
A seller/vendor can set up a virtual storefront via a Web site or
home page directly on the Internet.15 Alternatively, a vendor may set
up its virtual storefront by contracting with a commercial on-line
service (such as America Online, CompuServe, Prodigy, etc.) and
leasing space on the commercial on-line service’s own network.16
Commercial on-line services provide organized databases of infor-
mation such as sports, news, magazines, weather, and most impor-
tant for our purposes, home shopping.17 For instance, CompuServe’s
basic membership currently provides its users with access to more
than 125 stores, including department stores such as J.C. Penney
and Sears.18 Similarly, users of America Online can access the mar-
ketplace—containing storefronts of merchants primarily offering
boutique or specialty items—from the main menu.19
                                                                                                                 
12. See Reid Goldsborough, Reaching the Masses, PC NOVICE GUIDE TO THE INTERNET,
June 1996, at 92, 92.
13. See Resnick, supra note 8, at 121.
14. See Loshin, supra note 11, at 87-88.
15. See id. at 86.
16. See Richard Egan, Step into the Internet Through On-Line Services, PC NOVICE
GUIDE TO THE INTERNET, June 1996, at 32, 32.
17. Another important aspect of commercial on-line services is that in addition to the
information services they provide, they can provide access to the Internet. See id. at 32.
18. See Tracy LeBlanc, Shop ’Til You Drop, PC NOVICE GUIDE TO GOING ONLINE, Dec.
1995, at 145, 145.
19. See id.
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While potential customers can access a virtual storefront set up
via a Web site simply by accessing the Internet, they can access a
virtual storefront set up on a commercial on-line service’s network
only if they are subscribers to that particular commercial on-line
service, and thus connected to its network.20 Accordingly, if a vendor
sets up its virtual storefront by leasing space on the commercial on-
line service’s network, the virtual storefront will be accessible only
by subscribers of the service, not all Internet users.21
3.   Enormous New Opportunities Opened Up for Electronic
Merchants
Merchants are selling goods—such as music, books, flowers, elec-
tronic equipment, and practically anything else you can think of—
via the Internet and commercial on-line services.22 Some commenta-
tors predict that “[c]ybermalls will someday make physical shopping
malls as outdated as rotary phones.”23
Imagine that vendors can take orders for their products twenty-
four hours a day, every day of the year, without tying up any extra
staff.24 Imagine that they can open international markets for their
products, selling anywhere they can deliver.25 Finally, imagine that
vendors can turn their customers into their own twenty-four-hour
customer support staff.26 It is easy to see that the Internet, particu-
larly the Web, presents a tremendous opportunity for sellers due to
its low cost and easy accessibility.27 It offers fertile markets and tan-
talizing rewards for savvy marketers.28
Consider the previous example of the purchase of a laser printer.
A local vendor of electronics whose store is physically located in
California probably only sells to customers also located in that geo-
graphic area. However, if the vendor has a virtual storefront on the
Internet or on-line, then its potential customers are located any-
where the storefront is accessible. Enormous new markets are
                                                                                                                 
20. See Egan, supra note 16, at 32-33.
21. A user may obtain a direct connection or access to the Internet by paying an ISP.
Alternatively, the user can subscribe to a commercial on-line service to access the Internet.
In contrast to ISPs, Internet access is not the only service, or even the main service, that
commercial on-line services provide. Rather, commercial on-line services provide organized
databases of other information, such as sports, news magazines, weather, and home shop-
ping. See id. at 32.
22. See id.
23. Mitch Betts & Ellis Booker, Internet Renews Tax Battles; Murky On-Line Tax Ju-
risdictions Cause Trouble, COMPUTERWORLD, June 19, 1995 (quoting technology consultant
Samuel E. Blecker), available in LEXIS, Market Library, Promt File.
24. See Loshin, supra note 11, at 86.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See Goldsborough, supra note 12, at 92.
28. See Loshin, supra note 11.
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opened up for the vendor. Further, it is much easier for the vendor
to service the potential customers over the Internet or on-line than it
would be in the real world due to the lack of need for staff to make
sales in the virtual world.
B.   Problem Faced by States: Lost Revenue
It is estimated that forty-five percent of Internet users look up in-
formation about products on the Internet.29 So far, many merchants
use their Web sites or spaces on a commercial on-line service’s net-
work simply as extensions of their Yellow Pages advertisements.30
The more successful advertisements reproduce their product lines in
a kind of on-line catalog, complete with prices, ordering, and deliv-
ery information.31 The most effective ads also let consumers buy di-
rectly from the merchant for instant gratification.32 “While not a
large factor in commerce yet, commerce listings are exploding expo-
nentially.”33 A study by Input, a California-based information serv-
ices research firm, estimated that in 1994, $20 million worth of
business was conducted on-line; in 1995, the number grew to $40
million, and the 1996 estimate is a staggering $260 million.34 About
120 new companies each day are signing up for Internet addresses.35
“The number of World Wide Web pages devoted to ads for business
or products is growing at a rate of 12 percent a month.”36
As commerce grows over the Internet and on-line, so does concern
over revenue lost by states because of uncollected sales or use taxes
on products sold over the Internet or on-line.37 In fact, state and lo-
cal authorities fear that their “finances are being undone by rapid
changes in global commerce and information technologies, particu-
larly the rise of the Internet.”38 In particular, states are extremely
concerned about an erosion of their key revenue base: sales taxes.39
“The rise of untaxed commerce on the information superhighway
                                                                                                                 
29. See World Wide Web User Statistics, supra note 5.
30. See Loshin, supra note 11, at 87-88.
31. See id.
32. See Goldsborough, supra note 12, at 92.
33. Nathan Newman, Proposition 13 Meets the Internet: How State and Local Gov-
ernment Finances Are Becoming Roadkill on the Information Superhighway, 95 STATE TAX
NOTES 186-49, Sept. 26, 1995, available in LEXIS, Sttax Library, Stn File.
34. See Elizabeth Weise, What a Tangled Web We Weave, Associated Press, Dec. 29,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, AP File. Even more astounding, by other esti-
mates, the volume of sales generated by the Web in 1995 was $436 million, and is pre-
dicted to rise to $46 billion in 1998. See World Wide Web User Statistics, supra note 5.
35. See DeBare, supra note 2.
36. See id.
37. See Newman, supra note 33.
38. Id.
39. See id.
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will be a body blow to local government finances.”40 At the touch of a
button, consumers can obtain access to the lowest-priced goods
throughout the nation, and at the same time avoid sales taxes.41
Thus, it is feared that “interstate sales may explode over the Inter-
net, leaving state and local government finances in tatters.”42 As
commerce moves from the regular world to the virtual world, states
need to find a way to tax Internet sales.43 Some assert that Internet
or on-line sales are “too significant a part of the economy” to suggest
that they should be exempt in the long-term from taxation.44
C.   Companies Confused About Obligations
Companies already engaged in commerce over the Internet are
confused about their tax collection obligations.45 A July 1996 study
by KPMG Peat Marwick illustrates the uncertainty felt by compa-
nies.46 Nine out of ten executives of American companies engaged in
buying and selling over the Internet called for clarification in the
governing regulations.47 An overwhelming fifty-one percent of the
291 executives surveyed (of companies with gross revenues in excess
of $50 million) stated that the lack of clarity in state and local tax
laws governing electronic commerce was inhibiting their involve-
ment with Internet business applications.48 An alarming twenty per-
cent admitted that they did not know whether their companies were
even subject to sales and transaction taxes on the sale of products
and services over the Internet.49
It appears that many states are struggling with issues surround-
ing the taxation of sales over the Internet.50 A few have even created
study groups to deal with the issues involved.51 Clear guidelines are
                                                                                                                 
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. See Catherine Yang, New Tolls on the Info Highway?, BUS. WK., Feb. 12, 1996 at
96, 96 (quoting Multistate Tax Commission General Counsel Paull Mines).
44. Id. at 97.
45. See KPMG Peat Marwick, Electronic Commerce: Taxation Without Clarification
(visited Feb. 7, 1997) <http://usserve.us.kpmg.com/salt/archive/july96/story1.html>.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See Stacey Singer, Tax Collectors View Sales on Internet with Distress, CHI. TRIB.,
May 15, 1996, at 1.
51. For example, the California Legislature, worried that business transactions on
the Web escape taxation by states as well as local jurisdictions, has created the California
Internet Review Commission to look into applying sales taxes to the Internet. See David
Hipschman, Get Ready, They’re Trying to Tax Commerce on the Internet, THE LEDGER,
Mar. 17, 1996, at D11. Similarly, The Illinois Department of Revenue has established a
new study group to tackle the problems. See Singer, supra note 50.
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needed for states and for companies already transacting business
over the Internet or on-line, or those desiring to do so.52
III.   CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIER TO STATES’ IMPOSITION OF SALES OR
USE TAX
A.   Sales and Use Taxes Generally
States impose sales taxes on the sales of goods and services. Re-
tailers and vendors generally collect and then remit the taxes to the
state taxing authority.53 For example, if a woman who resides in
New York State purchases a laser printer from a merchant also a
resident of New York State, the merchant will collect a sales tax
from her at the time of the sale. States can only impose a sales tax
on intrastate sales transactions.54
States that impose a sales tax also invariably impose a compen-
sating use tax to ensure that residents who purchase goods in or
from another state will pay the equivalent of a sales tax on the pur-
chase in their state of residence.55 Thus, if a woman who resides in
New York State purchases a laser printer, via mail-order, from a
merchant who is a resident of California with “no physical pres-
ence”56 in New York State, then the merchant will not collect a sales
tax from her at the time of the sale. However, she will be responsible
for paying a New York State use tax.
Collecting the use tax from the purchaser, particularly where the
purchaser is an individual, is often inefficient and not cost-effective.
This is especially so because many consumers do not realize they are
subject to the use tax.57 One possible solution is to require the out-of-
state vendor to collect the tax from the purchaser and remit it to the
taxing state.58 However, requiring an out-of-state vendor to collect
the use tax from the in-state purchaser and remit it to the taxing
state presents constitutional problems.59
                                                                                                                 
52. See Yang, supra note 43.
53. See, e.g., Arthur R. Rosen & Walter Nagel, Sales and Use Taxes: General Princi-
ples, Tax Mgmt. Multistate Tax Portfolios (BNA) No. 1300, Dec. 22, 1995, at 2.
54. See id.
55. See COMMITTEE ON MULTISTATE TAX ISSUES, NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS’N,
REQUEST ON GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF NEW YORK’S SALES AND USE TAXES TO OUT-
OF-STATE VENDORS ¶ 6 [hereinafter NYSBA], reproduced in 96 STATE TAX NOTES 47-47,
Mar. 8, 1996, available in LEXIS, Sttax Library, Stn File. The use tax is generally equal to
the rate of sales tax in the purchaser’s state of residence minus the sales tax, if any, paid
at the time of sale. See id.
56. See infra Part III.B for discussion of the “physical presence” requirement.
57. See NYSBA, supra note 55, ¶ 7.
58. See id.
59. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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B.   Constitutional Barriers
A state cannot impose a sales or use tax collection obligation on
an out-of-state seller unless the imposition of the obligation meets
certain constitutional jurisdictional requirements.60 As discussed
below, the Commerce Clause61 and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment62 are constitutional barriers.
1.   Governing Supreme Court Cases
The Supreme Court has held that it is unconstitutional for a state
to impose a tax collection obligation on an out-of-state seller who has
no “physical presence” in, or nexus with, the taxing state.63 In both
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Illinois Department of Revenue 64 and
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ,65 the two seminal cases on the issue,
out-of-state sellers with no physical presence in-state were market-
ing and selling their goods to in-state residents through mail-order
catalogs.66 Presumably, the holdings regarding tax collection obliga-
tions of sellers with no physical presence in the taxing state also
apply to vendors who sell to in-state residents through the Internet
or on-line, rather than through mail-order catalogs.
a.   National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Illinois Department of Revenue
In Bellas Hess, Illinois imposed the duty of use tax collection on
National Bellas Hess, Inc., a mail-order house incorporated in Dela-
ware with its principal place of business in Missouri.67 National
Bellas Hess did not maintain any office, sales house, distribution
house, warehouse, or other place of business in Illinois; it did not
have an agent, salesman, solicitor, or other representative to sell or
take orders, to deliver merchandise, to accept payments, or to serv-
ice merchandise in Illinois; nor did it own any real or personal tan-
gible property in Illinois.68 Twice a year, it mailed catalogs and fly-
ers to the company’s active or recent customers throughout the vari-
                                                                                                                 
60. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
61. “The Congress shall have Power to . . . regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
62. “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
63. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1992); National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Illinois Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756-60 (1967).
64. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
65. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
66. See 386 U.S. at 753; 504 U.S. at 298.
67. See 386 U.S. at 753-54.
68. See id. at 754.
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ous states.69 It received orders though the mail, and then it sent the
ordered goods through the mail.70
Illinois imposed the use tax collection duty on “retailers main-
taining a place of business” in the state.71 The statute at issue de-
fined a “retailer maintaining a place of business” in Illinois as in-
cluding any retailer “[e]ngaging in soliciting orders within this State
from users by means of catalogues or other advertising, whether
such orders are received or accepted within or without this State.”72
The U.S. Supreme Court found that the statute violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce
Clause.73 The Court described the Commerce Clause as pertaining to
the justification of the burden imposed on interstate commerce by a
particular tax: “State taxation falling on interstate commerce . . . can
only be justified as designed to make such commerce bear a fair
share of the cost of the local government whose protection it enjoys.”74
The Court went on to state that the Due Process Clause required
fairness.75 It explained that the “simple but controlling question [in
determining whether it has been violated] is whether the state has
given anything for which it can ask [in] return.”76 The Due Process
Clause required “some definite link, some minimum connection, be-
tween a state and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax.”77
The Court noted that its previous decisions drew a sharp distinc-
tion “between mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or
property within a State, and those who do no more than communi-
cate with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part
of a general interstate business.”78 It decided that the distinction
was a valid one and declined to obliterate it.79 Thus, it held that the
Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause required that the
seller maintain some sort of presence in the taxing state.80
                                                                                                                 
69. See id.
70. See id. at 755.
71. See id.
72. Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 439.2 (1965)).
73. Id. at 756-60.
74. Id. at 756 (quoting Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946)).
75. See id.
76. Id. at 756 (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)).
77. Id. (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)).
78. Id. at 758.
79. See id.
80. The Court also made note of the heavy record-keeping or administrative burden
that would be imposed on vendors if they were forced to collect the sales or use tax. The
Court stated:
[I]f the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens upon National were upheld,
the resulting impediments upon the free conduct of its interstate business
would be neither imaginary nor remote. For if Illinois can impose such bur-
dens, so can every other State, and so, indeed, can every municipality, every
school district, and every other political subdivision throughout the Nation
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b.   Quill Corp. v. North Dakota
Approximately twenty-five years later, in Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota,81 the Supreme Court revisited its Bellas Hess holding. Here,
Quill, a Delaware corporation, sold “office equipment and supplies
through catalogs and flyers, advertisements in national periodicals,
and telephone calls.”82 It had no offices, warehouses, or employees in
North Dakota.83 It owned no tangible property in the state, and it
delivered all of its merchandise to its North Dakota customers by
mail or common carrier from out-of-state locations.84
North Dakota required every “retailer” in the state to collect a
use tax from each customer and remit it to the state.85 The term
“retailer” included “every person who engages in regular or systematic
solicitation of a consumer market in the state.”86 North Dakota filed
an action in state court to require Quill to collect and pay a use tax on
goods purchased for use in the state.87 The trial court ruled in favor of
Quill; the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed.88 The U.S. Su-
preme Court granted certiorari and held that North Dakota could
not require Quill to collect and pay the use tax.89 It concluded that
even though a state’s imposition of a tax may be consistent with the
Due Process Clause, it may nevertheless violate the Commerce
Clause.90
 The Court first explained that due process jurisprudence had
evolved in the twenty-five years since Bellas Hess and suggested
that some sort of physical presence was no longer necessary for ju-
risdiction under the Due Process Clause.91 It explained that it was
“an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial
amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communi-
cations across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical pres-
                                                                                                                 
with power to impose sales and use taxes. The many variations in rates of tax,
in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and record-keeping require-
ments could entangle National’s interstate business in a virtual welter of
complicated obligations to local jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to impose
“a fair share of the cost of the local government.”
Id. at 759-60 (footnotes omitted).
81. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
82. Id. at 302.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-07 (Supp. 1991)).
86. Id. at 302-03 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-01(6) (Supp. 1991)).
87. See id. at 303.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 318.
90. See id. at 305.
91. See id. at 307.
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ence within a State in which business is conducted.”92 Looking to its
personal jurisdiction decisions as authority, the Court noted it had
“abandoned more formalistic tests that focused on a defendant’s
‘presence’ within a State in favor of a more flexible inquiry into
whether a defendant’s contacts with the forum” made it reasonable
to require it to defend a suit there.93 It overruled Bellas Hess insofar
as it held that the Due Process Clause required a physical presence
in the state.94
The Court then analyzed whether the state’s imposition of the tax
violated the Commerce Clause.95 It noted that because the Due Proc-
ess Clause and the Commerce Clause were animated by different
constitutional concerns and policies, their nexus requirements were
different.96 The Court stated that, while the Due Process Clause was
concerned with fairness, the Commerce Clause, which prohibits any
state activity interfering with or burdening interstate commerce,
was concerned with the effects of state regulation upon the national
economy and with limiting state burdens on interstate commerce.97
The Court upheld the physical presence requirement for purposes of
the Commerce Clause based upon (1) principles of stare decisis, (2)
the need to have a “bright-line” rule in the area of sales and use tax
which encourages settled expectations and fosters investment by
businesses and individuals, and (3) the burden that the imposition
of a use tax collection obligation on sellers with no in-state presence
would have on interstate commerce.98 Thus, Quill established that
while the Due Process Clause does not require an out-of-state seller
to have physical presence in a state before the state may impose a
                                                                                                                 
92. Id. at 308 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).
93. Id. at 307.
94. See id. at 308.
95. See id. at 309.
96. See id. at 312.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 314-18. The Court said:
North Dakota’s use tax illustrates well how a state tax might unduly burden
interstate commerce. On its face, North Dakota law imposes a collection duty
on every vendor who advertises in the State three times in a single year. Thus,
absent the Bellas Hess rule, a publisher who included a subscription card in
three issues of its magazine, a vendor whose radio advertisements were heard
in North Dakota on three occasions, and a corporation whose telephone sales
force made three calls into the State, all would be subject to the collection duty.
What is more significant, similar obligations might be imposed by the Nation’s
6,000 plus taxing jurisdictions. [Further,] “the many variations in rates of tax,
in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and record-keeping require-
ments could entangle [a mail-order house] in a virtual welter of complicated
obligations” . . . .
Id. at 313 n.6 (second alteration in original) (quoting Bellas Hess, 383 U.S. at 759-
60).
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use tax collection duty on the seller, the Commerce Clause does re-
quire it.99
c.   Quill Leaves Open Avenue for Taxation of Out-of-State Sel lers
The Court’s holding in Quill is significant. Although at first
glance it seems the Court precluded the state taxation of out-of-state
sellers, a closer reading of Quill reveals that the Court did leave an
avenue open to achieve this goal.100 By removing the physical pres-
ence requirement for Due Process Clause purposes, but leaving it in-
tact for Commerce Clause purposes, the Court left “open the possi-
bility that Bellas Hess could be legislatively preempted by congres-
sional action.”101
The Constitution gives Congress plenary power to regulate inter-
state commerce.102 This has been interpreted as giving Congress the
ultimate power to authorize actions that unduly burden interstate
commerce.103 Thus, even if the Court finds that an action by a state
unduly burdens interstate commerce, because the Constitution gives
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce, Congress can
authorize such a violation.104
By finding that North Dakota’s action violated the Commerce
Clause (but not the Due Process Clause), the Quill Court left to
Congress the final decision as to whether state imposition of use tax
collection obligations on out-of-state sellers should be barred by a
lack of physical presence in the taxing state.105 The Court recognized
as much by stating that its decision that the Commerce Clause re-
quired physical presence in the taxing State was
made easier by the fact that the underlying issue is not only one
that Congress may be better qualified to resolve, but also one that
Congress has the ultimate power to resolve. No matter how we
evaluate the burdens that use taxes impose on interstate com-
merce, Congress remains free to disagree with our conclusions. In-
                                                                                                                 
99. See id. at 313.
100. See Maryann B. Gall & Laura A. Kulwicki, Limitations on States’ Jurisdiction to
Impose Sales and Use Taxes, Tax Mgmt. Multistate Tax Portfolios (BNA) No. 1420, Jan.
26, 1996, at 15-16.
101. Id.
102. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
103. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318.
104. Compare U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have power To . . . regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States, . . . .”) with id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . .
. deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). Unlike
the Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause does not grant Congress any affirmative
power. Thus, the Supreme Court, rather than Congress, has the final say as to whether it
has been violated. Congress does not have the power to authorize a violation of the Due
Process Clause. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 305.
105. See 504 U.S. at 318.
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deed, in recent years Congress has considered legislation that
would “overrule” the Bellas Hess rule. Its decision not to take ac-
tion in this direction may, of course, have been dictated by respect
for our holding in Bellas Hess that the Due Process Clause prohib-
its States from imposing such taxes, but today we have put that
problem to rest. Accordingly, Congress is now free to decide
whether, when, and to what extent the States may burden inter-
state mail-order concerns with a duty to collect use taxes.106
To this day, Congress has not authorized any violations of the Com-
merce Clause regarding the state taxation of out-of-state sellers.107
IV.   WAYS TO CONSTITUTIONALLY TAX SALES
States are left with the problem of how to constitutionally require
merchants, selling taxable goods to in-state customers over the In-
ternet, to collect and remit use taxes to the state, where their only
connection with the taxing state is the Internet.108 This Article ana-
lyzes several possible solutions.
A.   Congressional Authorization for States to Impose Tax
The obvious solution is to have Congress enact a law authorizing
state imposition of use tax collection obligations on out-of-state ven-
dors selling to in-state customers over the Internet or on-line. How-
ever, this is not very likely to happen. Numerous bills authorizing
such action have been proposed in the past, and they have never
progressed beyond subcommittee hearings.109 Although these bills
                                                                                                                 
106. Id. (citations omitted).
107. See infra notes 109, 111.
108. See, e.g., Betts & Booker, supra note 23.
109. Introduced during the late 1980s, prior to the Quill decision, the following legis-
lative proposals would have authorized states to tax outside vendors:
· The Main Street Fair Competition Act of 1988, S. 2368, 100th Cong., would have
authorized states to collect taxes with respect to sales of tangible personal property by
nonresident persons who solicit such sales. Senate Bill 2368 set forth a three-prong juris-
dictional standard that must have been satisfied before a state could require an out-of-
state seller to collect and remit tax on mail-order sales: (1) the destination of the sale must
have been within the taxing state; (2) the out-of-state retailer must have been engaged in
regular or systematic solicitation of sales within the taxing state; and (3) the out-of-state
retailer’s annual sales must have exceeded $15 million in the United States, or $750,000 in
the taxing state alone. See id. § 3.
· The Interstate Sales Tax Collection Act of 1987, H.R. 1242, 99th Cong., would have
authorized states to require a retailer engaged in business in-state to collect state and lo-
cal sales and use taxes on the sale or use of tangible personal property shipped or delivered
into the state. The bill defined a “retailer engaged in business in that state” to include:
“Any retailer soliciting orders for tangible personal property by mail if the solicitations are
substantial and recurring and if the retailer benefits from any banking, financing, debt
collection, telecommunications, or marketing activities occurring in that State or benefits
from the location in that State of authorized installation, servicing . . . facilities.” Id. The
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were aimed at recapturing the revenue lost by the inability to tax
out-of-state vendors who sold through mail-order catalogs, pre-
sumably, they would have applied to out-of-state vendors selling
over the Internet or on-line as well.
Admittedly, before Quill, Congress was not likely to consider the
proposed bills seriously because, even if it had authorized the bur-
den on interstate commerce, the bills would have nonetheless vio-
lated the Due Process Clause.110 However, even since the handing
down of the Quill decision, similar proposed legislation has come be-
fore Congress;111 despite the existence of concerns regarding state
need for greater revenues, similar to current concerns, Congress
                                                                                                                 
proposal exempted retailers whose annual nationwide gross sales of tangible personal
property did not exceed $5 million. See id.
For similar legislation, see the Equity in Interstate Competition Act, H.R. 2230, 101st
Cong. (1989); S. 480, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 3521, 100th Cong. (1987); H.R. 3549, 99th
Cong. (1985); S. 983, 96th Cong. (1979).
110. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756-60.
111. In February of 1994, Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas (a long-time proponent of
federal legislation in this context) introduced the Tax Fairness for Main Street Business
Act of 1994, S. 1825, 103d Cong., the first post-Quill bill dealing with taxation of interstate
mail-order sellers. See id. The bill authorized states to require out-of-state sellers to collect
and remit a state sales tax if the destination of the tangible personal property was in the
state, and if the seller’s gross receipts from sales of such tangible personal property ex-
ceeded $3 million in the United States, or exceeded $100,000 in the state. See id. § 3. On
April 13, 1994, the Senate Small Business Committee heard testimony from business rep-
resentatives who had a stake in the fate of Senate Bill 1825. See Amy Hamilton, House
Small Business Panel Hears Testimony on Interstate Sales Tax Collection, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Sept. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, Tnt File:
The House Small Business Subcommittee on Procurement, Taxation and
Tourism heard testimony on September 27[, 1994,] on the impact and fairness
of giving states the power to collect from mail-order catalog firms the sales
taxes incurred from purchases made by out-of-state mail-order customers.
Panel chairman James H. Bilbray deemed the hearing a precursor to the
104th Congress, when the House was likely to introduce a bill comparable to
S. 1825.
At the time the bill was being considered by the subcommittees, it was said that the cur-
rent administration was more favorably inclined to this legislation than past administra-
tions because President Clinton had supported such legislation when he was governor of
Arkansas. See id. The bill, however, was never enacted.
On March 13, 1995, Senator Bumpers introduced a nearly identical bill, the Consumer
and Main Street Protection Act of 1995, S. 545, 104th Cong. On April 5, 1995, the New
York State Bar Association Tax Section submitted a report on Senate Bill 545, generally
supporting, although with some reservations, the expansion of sales tax collection respon-
sibilities of out-of-state vendors. See NYSBA Reports on Bill to Require Out-of-State Ven-
dors to Collect Sales Tax, TAX NOTES TODAY, April 17, 1995, available in LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, Tnt File. The last action date on the bill was October 27, 1995.
The Independence for Families Act, H.R. 4414, 103d Cong. (1994), also contained provi-
sions addressing taxation of out-of-state sellers. It authorized state and local governments
to require certain out-of-state businesses to collect sales taxes with respect to tangible per-
sonal property where the destination of the tangible personal property was in the state.
See id. § 744. The bill exempted out-of-state sellers with gross receipts from sales of such
tangible personal property in the United States exceeding $3 million, or in the state ex-
ceeding $100,000. See id. The bill was never enacted.
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never took significant action towards enacting the legislation.112
Congress’s past record on similar legislation (even post-Quill pro-
posals) suggests that it is unlikely that such legislation will now be
enacted.113
It is, however, important to note that although a legislative solu-
tion has not been provided in the context of catalog sales, some have
remarked that such a solution is not foreclosed in the Internet
arena.114 “Because electronic sales are not an established industry as
catalog sales are, the money and power are not yet behind the indus-
try, forestalling change.”115 Some urge that to obtain congressional
approval, states should agree to use a portion of the taxes collected
to better electronic commerce.116 By having a fund to improve the
system, “states would create ‘sex appeal’ in Washington because
there would be a new funding source.”117
Furthermore, an important factor that may influence Congress in
passing legislation is that, because of recently introduced new soft-
ware, the record-keeping and administrative burden imposed on out-
of-state vendors, which worried the Supreme Court in Bellas Hess
and Quill, has significantly decreased.118 New software, such as
TAXWARE, specifically designed for sales over the Internet, can
track sales and use tax rates in more than 65,000 tax jurisdictions
through zip code information required of a customer before an elec-
tronic commerce transaction takes place.119 Perhaps this software
will ease Congress’s concern that out-of-state sellers will be greatly
burdened.120
                                                                                                                 
112. For example, at the time Senate Bill 1825 was under consideration, a May 1994
report by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations estimated that
total potential revenue from taxation of interstate mail-order sales for 1994 was $4.57 bil-
lion. See Taxation of Interstate Mail Order Sales: 1994 Revenue Estimates, GOV’T FIN. REV.,
Oct. 1994, at 23, 26. However, Senate Bill 1825 never moved beyond subcommittee hear-
ings.
113. See supra note 111.
114. See Harriet Hanlon, MTC Examines Making (Tax) Money on the Internet, 95
STATE TAX NOTES 150-26, Aug. 4, 1995 (discussing remarks of Stewart Baker, former gen-
eral counsel for the National Security Agency, currently practicing with an international
and technology law firm in Washington, D.C.), available in LEXIS, Sttax Library, Stn File.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. See Amy Hamilton, Netscape Installing Software That Will Calculate, Track Sales
Taxes on Online Sales, 95 STATE TAX NOTES 218-40, Nov. 13, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Sttax Library, Stn File; AVP Tax Software Available with Netscape Internet Applications,
PR Newswire, Nov. 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Busdtl File.
119. See Hamilton, supra note 118.
120. See id.
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B.   Constitutionality Under the Representational Nexus Theory
An argument exists that the jurisdictional nexus that is required
for taxation of out-of-state sellers can be found to exist under a
“representational/agency” theory.121 This argument is based upon a
series of Supreme Court cases finding that an out-of-state person
has physical presence in the taxing state because it has in-state rep-
resentatives or agents physically present in the taxing state.122 This
Article concludes, after examination, that this theory of nexus does
not provide jurisdiction over out-of-state merchants selling over the
Internet or on-line.
1.   Representational Nexus Line of Cases
In Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Department of
Revenue,123 the U.S. Supreme Court faced the question of whether
Washington State could impose its business and occupation tax124 on
an out-of-state manufacturer that sold its products in-state but had
no property, offices, or employees in Washington, and whose solici-
tation of business in the state was conducted by a sales representa-
tive located there.125
The Court held that there was sufficient nexus based upon the
presence of the representatives in Washington.126 It stated that “the
crucial factor governing nexus is whether the activities performed in
this state on behalf of the taxpayer are significantly associated with
the taxpayer’s ability to establish and maintain a market in this
state for the sales.”127 The sales representatives acted daily on behalf
                                                                                                                 
121. See R. Scot Grierson, Constitutional Limitations on State Taxation: States and
Use Tax Nexus on the Information Highway, 96 STATE TAX NOTES 35-38, Feb. 21, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Sttax Library, Stn File.
122. See e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S.
232, 251 (1987) (holding the existence of in-state representatives created a nexus allowing
states to tax).
123. 483 U.S. 232 (1987).
124. Washington imposed a business and occupation tax on “the act or privilege of en-
gaging in business activities in the State.” Id. at 234-35 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE §
82.04.240 (1985)). The tax applied “to the activities of extracting raw materials in the
State, manufacturing in the State, making wholesale sales in the State, and making retail
sales in the State. The measure of the selling tax is the ‘gross proceeds of sales.’ ” Id. at
236 (footnotes omitted).
125. See id. at 249. Although Tyler Pipe concerned the imposition of the business and
occupation tax, rather than a sales or use tax, it appears that the nexus requirements for
both types of taxes are the same. This conclusion is based upon the fact that the two cases
the Tyler Pipe Court cited as supporting its holding, Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, Sheriff, 362
U.S. 207 (1960), and National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization, 430
U.S. 551 (1977), concerned use taxes. See 483 U.S. at 250.
126. See Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 251.
127. Id. at 250 (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Dep’t. of Revenue, 715 P.2d 123, 126
(Wash. 1986)).
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of Tyler Pipe by calling on its customers and soliciting orders.128
Through sales contracts, the representatives maintained and im-
proved Tyler Pipe’s name recognition, market share, goodwill, and
individual customer relations.129 The sales representatives provided
Tyler Pipe with virtually all of its “information regarding the
Washington market, including product performance, competing
products, pricing, market conditions and trends, existing and up-
coming construction products, customer financial liability, and other
critical information of a local nature concerning the Washington
market.”130
Similarly, in Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, Sheriff ,131 Scripto, Inc., a
Georgia corporation engaged in the business of selling mechanical
writing instruments, did not “own, lease, or maintain any office, dis-
tributing house, warehouse, or other place of business in Florida, or
have a regular employee or agent there.”132 Orders for its products
were solicited by ten “jobbers,” or salesmen, who were residents of
Florida and were designated as independent contractors by their
agreements with Scripto.133 Based upon the presence of the ten
salesmen conducting continuous local solicitation in Florida, the
Court found that there was a sufficient nexus for collection of the
use tax from Scripto.134
In Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue of Was h-
ington,135 Standard Pressed Steel Co., a manufacturer of industrial
and aerospace fasteners, challenged the constitutionality of the
business and occupation tax that Washington levied on Standard’s
receipts from its sales to Boeing, its principal Washington cus-
tomer.136 Standard’s only presence in-state was one employee, an
engineer who operated out of his home.137 His primary duty was to
consult with Boeing regarding its anticipated needs and require-
ments for aerospace fasteners and to follow up any difficulties in the
use of the product after delivery.138 The Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the imposition of the tax.139
                                                                                                                 
128. See id. at 249.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 250 (quoting Tyler Pipe, 715 P.2d at 127).
131. 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
132. Id. at 209.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 211.
135. 419 U.S. 560 (1975).
136. See id. at 562.
137. See id. at 561.
138. See id.
139. For similar facts and holdings, see General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission
of the State of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335 (1944), and Felt & Tarrant Manufacturing Co. v. Gal-
lagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939).
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2.   Application of Representational Nexus Theory to Internet and
On-Line Sales
At least one scholar had argued that “states can apply the ex-
press rule of these agency/representative . . . cases to persuade
courts and administrative tribunals to find substantial nexus”140 for
out-of-state sellers. An examination reveals that this theory cannot
serve as the basis for jurisdiction over out-of-state merchants selling
over the Internet or on-line.
a.   Commercial On-Line Service Serving as Agent of Registered
Seller
Some argue that states have jurisdiction to tax out-of-state ven-
dors, who lease space on a commercial on-line service’s network and
register with them as sellers, by virtue of the commercial on-line
service’s physical presence141 in-state.142 June Summers, director of
the Multistate Tax Commission’s National Nexus Program, asserts
that a commercial on-line service such as CompuServe has hard-
ware, and thus physical presence, in every state.143 R. Scot Grierson,
a tax attorney, contends that
[u]nder the agency/representative nexus analysis . . . a
[vendor/seller] offering its service through the CompuServe net-
work may have nexus with a given jurisdiction because of its rela-
tionship with CompuServe, i.e., because CompuServe is acting as
the seller’s in-state representative. In this instance, the . . . seller’s
relationship with CompuServe is directly “associated with the tax-
payer’s ability to establish and maintain a market in the state for
the sales.”144
Accordingly, supporters of the agency theory in the context of on-line
sales reach the conclusion that the commercial on-line service’s in-
state physical presence provides a nexus for taxation of the out-of-
state vendors registered as sellers with the commercial on-line
service.145
                                                                                                                 
140. Grierson, supra note 121 (making argument with respect to nexus for commercial
on-line service providers).
141. Commercial on-line services have a “physical presence” in almost every state be-
cause they have a mainframe, in which they store their data, in almost every state. See id.
142. It is important to note that this argument only attempts to establish jurisdiction
over sellers registered with the commercial on-line service, and not over sellers selling over
the Internet.
143. See Hanlon, supra note 114.
144. Grierson, supra note 121 (making argument with respect to sellers of information
as opposed to tangible goods) (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep’t of
Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 250 (1981)).
145. See id.
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The problem with viewing commercial on-line service providers
as representatives of the kind in the Tyler Pipe line of cases is that
they do not perform the types of activities on behalf of the vendor
that the Tyler Pipe representatives performed.146 The commercial on-
line services merely carry the vendor’s “advertisement” or informa-
tion into every state, much like the U.S. Postal Service delivers an
advertising pamphlet, or a magazine carries an advertisement into
every state.147 Accordingly, basing nexus jurisdiction on the physical
presence of a commercial on-line service would be very similar to
basing nexus jurisdiction on the physical presence of the U.S. Postal
Service or other mail carrier in every state, or on a magazine, dis-
tributed in every state, in which the out-of-state seller advertises.
Tyler Pipe provides that “the crucial factor governing nexus is
whether the activities performed in this state on behalf of the tax-
payer are significantly associated with the taxpayer’s ability to es-
tablish and maintain a market in this state for the sales.”148 The
Court noted that the sales representatives acted daily on behalf of
Tyler Pipe by calling on its customers and soliciting orders.149 They
maintained and improved the name recognition, market share,
goodwill, and individual customer relations of the seller.150 They
provided Tyler Pipe with virtually all its information regarding the
Washington market, including product performance, competing
products, pricing market conditions and trends, and customer fi-
nancial liability.151 Similarly, in Scripto, the salesmen were actively
engaged in Florida as representatives of the seller for the purpose of
attracting, soliciting, and obtaining Florida customers.152 In Stan-
dard Pressed Steel , the representative consulted with a major pur-
chaser of the taxpayer’s product regarding its anticipated needs and
requirements for the product, and followed up with consultation as
to any difficulties in the use of the product.153
Commercial on-line services do not perform the same types of ac-
tivities that the in-state representatives performed in the agency
line of cases.154 Although commercial on-line services put vendors in
                                                                                                                 
146. Robert Levering, senior vice president of the Direct Marketing Association in
Washington, notes that the retailer only has an arm’s-length contract to use the on-line
service as a communications carrier. See Betts & Booker, supra note 23, at 64.
147. See id.
148. 483 U.S. at 250.
149. See id. at 251.
150. See id. at 249.
151. See id. at 250.
152. See 362 U.S. at 209.
153. See 419 U.S. at 561.
154. It is noteworthy that National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equali-
zation, 430 U.S. 551 (1977), also has been cited as a case supporting the
agency/representative theory of nexus. See Grierson, supra note 121. Specifically, it is
cited to suggest that the agency/representative theory of nexus establishes jurisdiction
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touch with customers all over the world, and in some cases provide
services such as payment collection, they do not engage in active so-
licitation on behalf of the seller, or provide the type of customer sup-
port services the Tyler Pipe representatives did.155 Accordingly, the
agency/representative theory does not establish nexus over out-of-
state vendors selling through commercial on-line services.
b.   Telecommunications Provider Serving as In-State Agent or
Representative
A related argument for establishing jurisdiction over vendors who
lease space on a commercial on-line service’s network is that the in-
                                                                                                                 
over an out-of-state seller regardless of the nature of the activities the agent performs on
behalf of the seller. See id. This is somewhat misleading. In the case, National Geographic,
a nonprofit corporation with headquarters in the District of Columbia, maintained two of-
fices in California that solicited advertising copy for National Geographic’s monthly
magazine. See 430 U.S. at 552. The two offices performed no activities related to National
Geographic’s operation of a separate line of business—its mail-order business for the sale
of maps, atlases, globes, and books. See id. Orders for these items were mailed from Cali-
fornia directly to National Geographic’s Washington, D.C., members and magazine sub-
scribers, or on order forms contained in the magazine. See id. Deliveries were made by
mail from National Geographic’s Washington, D.C., or Maryland offices. See id. National
Geographic challenged the constitutionality of California’s use tax, as applied to its mail-
order activities in California.
The Court found that the requisite nexus for the imposition of the use-tax-collection obli-
gation. See id. at 556. It found that National Geographic was “present” in California based
on its maintenance of two offices in California. See id. In so finding, the Court was not
troubled by the fact that the activities carried on by the two offices in California were
wholly unrelated to National Geographic’s mail-order business, and explained that
the relevant constitutional test to establish the requisite nexus for requiring an
out-of-state seller to collect and pay the use tax is not whether the duty to col-
lect the use tax relates to the seller’s activities carried on within the State, but
simply whether the facts demonstrate “some definite link, some minimum con-
nection, between [the State and] the person . . . it seeks to tax.”
Id. at 561 (alteration in original) (quoting Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-345
(1954)).
It is important to note that the requisite nexus was based on National Geographic’s ac-
tual physical presence in the state, not the presence of National Geographic’s agents or
representatives in-state. See id. at 556. The two offices located in California were not act-
ing as agents of National Geographic, or owned or run by entitities separate from National
Geographic; they were owned and run by National Geographic. Thus, the language of Na-
tional Geographic to the effect that nexus may be found without regard to the nature of the
activity carried on within the state is not relevant for determining whether nexus based on
an agency/representative theory exists. See id. at 560.
155. Where the vendor is selling digitized versions of traditionally tangible personal
property (such as books or music), and the commercial on-line service actually helps de-
liver the digitized information, the assertion is made that the commercial on-line service,
which is delivering the product being sold, is acting as an in-state representative of the
seller because it is directly “associated with the taxpayer’s ability to establish and main-
tain a market in the state for the sales.” Grierson, supra note 121 (quoting Tyler Pipe, 483
U.S. at 250). However, the commercial on-line service is acting no differently from the U.S.
Postal Service when it delivers shopping catalogs, as well as ordered merchandise, to an
in-state customer. Thus, it is difficult to see why the agency/representative argument has
any more force when the product being sold by the out-of-state seller is digitized informa-
tion delivered by the commercial on-line service rather than a tangible good.
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state telecommunications infrastructure that allows for delivery of
the seller’s storefront serves as the physical presence in-state.156
Commercial on-line services typically supplement the reach of their
own networks through agreements with other telecommunications
providers to ensure delivery of their product in the various states.157
Some commentators suggest that the telecommunications provider
effectively acts as the conduit through which the information of the
seller must travel to take advantage of the benefits of the market
state.158 Thus, it is urged that the telecommunications provider es-
sentially acts as the seller’s in-state distributor or representative.159
This reasoning can be extended to argue that the telecommunica-
tions provider serves as the basis for jurisdiction over out-of-state
vendors selling to in-state customers over the Internet. Internet serv-
ice providers (ISPs) use the telecommunications infrastructure for de-
livery of information, so that the telecommunications provider, who
controls the telecommunications infrastructure, acts as an in-state
representative of the vendor whose message it allows to be deliv-
ered.160
This argument is flawed. Again, the telecommunications provid-
ers merely carry the vendor’s information into the taxing state. They
do not engage in active solicitation or perform other services similar
to those provided by the Tyler Pipe representatives.
Additionally, the argument assumes that the physical presence of
a representative of the vendor’s representative is sufficient to pro-
vide jurisdiction over the vendor: the vendor contracts with the ISP
or commercial on-line service, who contracts with the telecommuni-
cations provider, who in turn has the in-state physical presence.
This goes beyond the holding of Tyler Pipe and similar cases. Tyler
Pipe held that the in-state physical presence of a representative of
the seller may serve as the basis of jurisdiction over the seller.161 If
the physical presence of a representative of a vendor’s representa-
tive can serve as the basis of jurisdiction, then conceivably a state
could establish jurisdiction over practically anyone.
                                                                                                                 
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id. It is noteworthy that R. Scot Grierson makes the agency/nexus argument
in the context of obtaining jurisdiction over sellers of digitized information. See id. His
theory is that the relationship between the telecommunications and the digitized informa-
tion seller is singularly important because delivery of the information is impossible with-
out the telecommunications vehicle. See id. He reasons that the “unequivocal physical
presence of the in-state telecommunications equipment inures to the [benefit of the] infor-
mation seller, thereby creating the requisite substantial nexus.” Id.
160. To connect to the Internet, users must obtain access to the Internet. They can ob-
tain a direct connection by paying a fee to an ISP, such as SprintLink or AT&T EasyLink.
Alternatively, they can obtain a connection by paying a commercial on-line monthly fee.
161. See 483 U.S. at 249-50.
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Furthermore, the argument appears to assume that there is one
person or centralized figure who owns or acts on behalf of the tele-
communications infrastructure over which the message travels to
reach its destination. There is no such centralized figure. The tele-
communications infrastructure is controlled by many different par-
ties.162 Thus, it is unclear who exactly is serving as the out-of-state
vendor’s representative. Additionally, it is important to note that
emerging technology, such as microwaves, satellites, and radio-waves,
will be used to transmit information over the Internet in the future.163
Thus, there may not be any “physically present” telecommunications
equipment in-state upon which jurisdiction may be based.
c.   Other Agency Theories
It has been urged that a state has jurisdiction over an out-of-state
seller because the ISPs have a physical presence in the state and are
representatives of the vendor.164 Some suggest that states may ob-
tain jurisdiction over out-of-state vendors selling over the Internet or
on-line because of the in-state presence of credit card payment sys-
tems they use.165 These representational nexus theories fail to take
account of the relationship between the in-state representative and
the seller. To serve as the basis of jurisdiction for tax purposes, the
representative must perform solicitation or customer service activi-
                                                                                                                 
    162. [I]t often is said that “no one” owns the Internet. In fact, the ’Net is owned
by many someones who all control their own pieces of it. When a network is
connected to the Internet, it is generally understood that some of the resulting
traffic will have nothing to do with local computers. System operators let this
data flow by on its way to other destinations. . . . The present Internet is a
loose collection of huge networks run largely by giant phone companies such as
MCI and Sprint, connected at several major points with many smaller regional
net[w]orks.
Alan Phelps, Ready, Set, Click: The Internet Races into the Mainstream, PC NOVICE GUIDE
TO THE INTERNET, June 1996, at 6, 7-8.
On the regional level, smaller state-wide or multi-state backbones carry data
to local servers where users dial in or connect via special dedicated lines. . . .
High-speed lines connect larger cities while small conduits fan out to local access
points. The system is connected to the larger Internet at several points. . . . [At
the national level,] [i]n the United States, Internet traffic is carried through a
variety of networks. . . . Two of the largest systems are run by telephone giants
Sprint and MCI. Their backbones carry much of the long-distance Internet
communications across the continent. Regional networks wire into the larger
systems and each other at many places, producing a system that can easily
route round local malfunctions. Four main Network Access Points (NAPs) lo-
cated around the country offer high-speed switching between the biggest net-
works.
Phelps, supra note 6, at 13.
163. See ELLSWORTH & ELLSWORTH, supra note 1, at 36-37.
164. See David Brunori, ABA Tax Section Meeting: State Panel Debates Future of In-
ternet Taxation, UDITPA, 96 STATE TAX NOTES 94-24, May 14, 1996, available in LEXIS,
Sttax Library, Stn File.
165. See Hanlon, supra note 114 (statement of Stewart Baker).
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ties of the same magnitude and nature as those of the Tyler Pipe
representatives, thus allowing the establishment and maintenance
of a market by the seller in the taxing state.166 The representatives
in the above-cited theories do not perform activities similar to those
of the Tyler Pipe representatives.
Thus, the theories of representational nexus do not establish ju-
risdiction over out-of-state vendors selling over the Internet or on-
line. It is interesting to note, however, that the Multistate Tax
Commission’s current draft of nexus guidelines adopts a represen-
tational nexus approach in the area of Internet sales.167
C.   Changing the Definition of “Physical Presence”
Some might suggest that in light of changing technology, the pre-
sent physical presence definition may be outmoded and in need of
revision.168 As technology advances and becomes more widespread, it
becomes exceedingly easy for persons to engage in activities in vari-
ous jurisdictions, without physical presence within the jurisdic-
tion.169 The virtual presence of a seller in a state allows her to ad-
vertise her product, demonstrate it, obtain and accept orders, pro-
vide customer support, and obtain customer feedback—nearly all the
activities in which physical presence would have allowed her to en-
                                                                                                                 
166. See 483 U.S. at 249-50.
167. The current MTC Guidelines state:
Physical Presence: An out-of-state business is, or is deemed to be, physically
present in the taxing state for possible application of that state’s sales or use
tax when the business engages in one or more of the following activities beyond
a de minimis level:
. . . .
(7) maintains in the taxing State by private contract, and not by purchase
from a common carrier in the common carrier’s status as common carrier, tele-
communications linkage that permits, the out-of-state business to establish and
maintain a market in the taxing State . . . .
MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N, NEXUS GUIDELINE FOR APPLICATION OF A TAXING STATE’S SALES
AND USE TAX TO A REMOTE SELLER § II.C.7 (draft of Oct. 25, 1994). The examples in the
guidelines of nexus include:
(a) Activities of a contract carrier that is the actual in-state deliverer (service
provider) of the very transaction that is the actual object of what is being sold.
(b) Advertising directed at in-state persons through local newspapers or peri-
odicals or local television, radio, or other local means of electronic transmis-
sion.
(c) Maintenance of a dedicated or virtual telecommunications network that
facilitates or promotes the market of the out-of-state business in the taxing
State.
. . . .
(f) Regular use of a financial network, such as a credit or debit card system,
that facilitates or promotes the market of the out-of-state business in the tax-
ing State.
Id. § III.A.4.
168. See Betts & Booker, supra note 23.
169. See id.
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gage.170 Further, as Virtual Reality Transfer Protocol (VRTP) be-
comes available, virtual showrooms and product demonstrations can
become part of the Web.171 Consumers will be able to virtually walk
through a showroom or mall, drive a car, use a computer, or talk to
technical support personnel using the Web.172
It is likely that when the Supreme Court wrote the opinions in
Bellas Hess and Quill, it did not foresee that sales over the Internet
could occur, or that they would become so prevalent. It might be ar-
gued that a simple solution allowing states to tax Internet and on-
line sales would be for state legislatures to enact statutes expanding
the definition of physical presence to encompass “virtual presence.”
The seller would be viewed as having physical presence in any ju-
risdiction where its Web site is accessed by a consumer.
While changing the definition of physical presence to include vir-
tual presence seems an appealing and simple solution, it presents
problems. By changing and expanding the definition of physical
presence, and in effect equating nonphysical presence in a state with
physical presence, the state legislative bodies would be writing the
constitutional requirement of physical presence out of existence.173
No one would dispute that it would be unconstitutional for a state
legislature, in response to Bellas Hess and Quill, to enact a statute
providing that the presence of mail-order catalogs in-state of an out-
of-state seller constituted physical presence of the seller in the
state.174 It is important to note that there is no real difference be-
tween a seller making sales to in-state customers over the Internet
and a seller making sales to in-state customers via mail-order cata-
logs. There is no meaningful difference between a customer receiving
a catalog in the mail and then dialing up a phone number to place
an order, and a customer accessing a seller’s Web site and placing
an order via the Web site itself. Certainly the customer can place the
order more immediately on the Web site, without having the inter-
mediate step involved of picking up a telephone to place her order,
and have questions about the product answered, so that she can
obtain instant gratification. However, one type of presence is no
closer to falling within the definition of “physical presence” than
the other.
                                                                                                                 
170. See Loshin, supra note at 11, 86-88.
171. See ELLSWORTH & ELLSWORTH, supra note 1, at 292.
172. See id.
173. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 314-18 (finding that the Commerce Clause requires an out-
of-state seller to have physical presence in a state before the state may impose a use tax on
the seller).
174. See id.; see also 386 U.S. at 756-60 (finding it unconstitutional for states to impose
a use tax on an out-of-state seller with no physical presence in the state).
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V.   CONCLUSION
The representational nexus theory does not provide a jurisdic-
tional nexus. Changing the definition of physical presence is also an
unworkable solution. While the idea of millions or billions of dollars
of Internet and on-line sales taking place untaxed may seem outra-
geous to some, it appears that presently the only way states can con-
stitutionally impose use tax collection obligations on out-of-state
vendors selling to in-state customers over the Internet and on-line is
if Congress passes a definitive statute allowing such taxation.
Until states persuade Congress to allow them to tax out-of-state
vendors based upon their presence on the Internet or on-line, com-
panies are free to sell goods without collecting use tax, as long as
they do not otherwise have physical presence in-state.
